 Long needed history
It is refreshing to read a book which deals with a key battle in the history of the Western world. Lenin's dream of sweeping into Germany and beyond to impose a soviet system with it's class warfare, secret police, etc. was stopped by a new country which had suffered perhaps more than Russia during the First World War. If the Poles had not defeated the Red Army in 1920 the history of the remainder of the century would have been far different, but not necessarily better. All one has to do is review the failures and crimes of the the Soviets over a period of seventy years and imagine those crimes being inflicted over all Europe.
The world owes a thanks to the valiant Poles who sacrificed so much to defeat of the Red Army. This book presents in a short, concise manner the key personalities, strategies, errors and color of that dramatic time. A worthwhile read to better understand the outlook of Eastern Europe from that time to today.
 A story of a long forgotten war
Poland's history is tinged in blood. For a long period the country had been battle ground for warring powers. Thrice in her tragic past Poland was partitioned among big powers. New Polish state emerged thanks to Allied powers during the end of Great War. Soon it incurred the wrath of powerful neighbours. Poland and Russia always at daggers drawn.Supreme Command of Allied powers fixed Poland's eastern frontier along river Bug which came to be called Curzon line. This did not satisfy Poland's strong man Josef Pilsudski. He sought to re establish country's frontier of 1772: the line of Dvina - Dneiper.
By this time Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. Allied intervention in the civil war in Russia made it apparent for Lenin that West intended to stifle Bolshevik revolution. Under the circumstances for Bolsheviks only hope for ensuring survival was to export revolution. To make this possible they established Third International/ Comintern. Wracked by civil strife ,political dissension, mounting unemployment Germany looked a tempting prospect. Road to Berlin lay through Poland. Above facts form background of this book.
Russians mustered overwhelming strength along the Western Front to the north of Pripet marshes. Lenin increased the number of divisions from 5 to 20. The operation was to be supported by armies of South Western Front from Ukraine. Plan of campaign was worked out by Chief of Operations Branch of Red Army General Staff Boris M. Shaposhnikov.Author shows how Poles successfully resisted the onslaught of Russian colossus.
But firstly he provides quantitative/ qualitative features of the forces of the two adversaries. Russian 'Tachanka' impressed me a lot. This weapon was a combination of mobility and firepower. It was a machine gun mounted on a horse-drawn buggy having a crew of three. One man driving the horses and the other two manned the machine guns.It galloped towards the enemy infantry . After coming to a close range it veered around and let loose withering fire before galloping away. Author then gives a topographical analysis of zone of operations which he says resembled a triangle. Front was nearly thousand kilometres long and the wedge bisected the triangle into two halves. This was a great expanse of bogs, rivers , forests called Pripet marshes. What that meant was armies advancing from west to east or reverse would be channeled along either of the two corridors.Either of the adversary armies if advanced too far would find their flanks exposed.
Another striking thing Poles developed techniques for monitoring communications of her foes. Russian ciphers were pierced.By the beginning of 1920s she was listening every radio station in Western Russia. Russian radio security procedures were also loose which made the task easier. Poles knew Red Army massing troops along her eastern border.This made Pilsudski initiate hostilities, for he realised Russia had to knocked out quickly otherwise Poland would be swamped.
Polish army lunged into Ukraine seized Kiev but could not hold out for long. Soon dislodged by forces of Marshal Semion Budionny 's South Western Front. Simultaneously Marshal Tukhachevsky Western Front began its relentless advance which took Bolsheviks to the gates of Warsaw. Disintegration of the Polish state appeared imminent.
Front near Warsaw ran diagonally from northwest to southeast . As Tukhachevski's forces forged ahead , it came to be separated by Red Army units of South Western Front . Two fronts were loosely connected by a weak centre. Pilsudski reasoned the weak centre could be easily brushed aside by launching a strong counter offensive. Wedge can be driven between the two fronts besides turning Tukhachevski's southern flank.Further by exploiting the thrust Poles can fall behind the rear of Russian armies consequently unhinging Tukhachevski 's dispositions facing Warsaw. The manoeuvre was successfully executed which led what some historians call the 'Miracle at Vistula'. Strike resembled what Alexander executed at Arbela in 331 BC. Here it should be remembered the Macedonian pinned down the Persian right, broke through weak left centre and enveloped Persian right wing and fell upon its rear.
Russian Polish conflict was extraordinary in many ways. Unlike the positional warfare in the marshy and muddy terrain of Flanders in Great War; mobility, surprise , manoeuvre formed the hall marks of this campaign. Cavalry proved decisive. Poles while retreating made no attempt to entrench. Their commanders realised its futility. Front was wide and forces available to hold were small. Entrenchments could always be turned by superior Russian cavalry.
Russian repulse at the gates of Warsaw had far -reaching consequences upon the destiny of Poland. Later Soviet dictator took a terrible revenge when he connived with Hitler in partioning the country again. Flower of Polish officer corps was liquidated by NKVD troops in Katyn forest in Byelorussia. Poland has not regained and will never regain her old borders.She had to settle for much disliked Curzon line. Such are the eternal laws of History: For victors the fruits ,the losers the spoils.
Finally, tenor of the book is virulently anti Russian. Author has made some caustic comments and has vehemently berated Bolsheviks. Russian apologists may find this offending. Nevertheless he has done a good job by bringing into limelight a conflict which faded away from human memory . A clash which had profound impact on the course of World History.
 Poland vs. Muscowy: The condensed version
I'm still trying to figure out why Adam Zamoyski wrote "Warsaw 1920." Polonophile-chauvinist Norman Davies had already written a decent history of the Polish-Soviet War in 1972 with White Eagle, Red Star (278 pages). Warsaw 1920 was published thirty-six years later but it offers no new revealing insights on the subject. In fact, it can claim only 138 pages, and they are very small pages at that. As much as I prefer Zamoyski over Davies, if you're interested in reading about the little-known Polish-Soviet War, find a copy of Davies.
An Outstanding Work: Addressing the Revisionists
Instead of repeating other reviewers, I focus mostly on specific issues.
To begin with, there is no contradiction between the wartime emaciation of Russia and her expansionist ambitions. To the contrary: The commentary on the inside front cover states that: "In 1920 the new Soviet state was a mess, following a brutal civil war. The best way of insuring its survival appeared to be to export the revolution to Germany, itself economically ruined by defeat in World War I and racked by internal dissension."
Nor is it true that the Poles started the 1920 War. In this overall geographic region, one set of political and combat events had succeeded another, and WWI had never ended. So talk of a "new war" is meaningless. The German armies, occupying this territory, began to withdraw and to be replaced by Russians. (So the Russians were conducting an invasion-by-osmosis: my term. This was called `Target Vistula': p. 8). After a short battle with some Polish units, the Soviets seized Wilno (Vilna, Vilnius) on January 5, 1919. (p. 8). (This was as much an act of war against Poland as if the Soviets had seized Warsaw or Krakow.) So Pilsudski's subsequent "attack" was actually a counterattack. (p. 9).
In any case, it is absurd to suppose that the Poles and Russians had the same valid claim to the territories east of the Curzon line. These territories had belonged to Poland until the Partitions of the late eighteenth century. They had never belonged to Russia up to that time. Also, the territories contained a large Polish minority and considerable Polish cultural development. In contrast, the Russian population and Russian culture on these territories had been virtually nonexistent before the Partitions, and, even after over a century of Russian rule, remained much smaller than their Polish counterparts. So, by any rational measure, the Poles had much greater moral and political right to these territories than the Soviets. (Taking this further, note that the entire Russian empire, first tsarist and then Communist, consisted of numerous non-Russian peoples conquered by Russia. Ironic to Soviet protestations about Poland's "non-ethnographic" boundaries, most of the Russian empire had always consisted of territories where ethnic Russians formed a distinct minority).
Polish-Ukrainian relations, etc., were a separate issue. Zamoyski notes that, regardless of the degree of eventual Polish possession of these territories (direct or federated), Pilsudski's top priority was to deny them to the Soviets. (p. 9). The Petlura (Petlyura) Ukrainian Army may have been small, but was nontrivial in size. It peaked at about 30,000 members. (p. 37, 135).
This book contains details about such things as the beginnings of mechanized warfare by both sides (e. g., the Putilov armored cars), and the Polish successes in cracking the Russian military codes. (p. 28). The latter skill, of course, was later further developed into the Poles' cracking of the "invincible" Nazi German ENIGMA code.
Lenin's Reach for a People's Uprising
This is pretty much a description of each battle, the troops involved, the movements of the troops and the aftermath. Some but not much discussion of where mistakes were made and what the alternate outcomes might have meant. The bottom line of the invasion of Russia by Poland in 1919, was a totally miscalculated decision by Marshall Pilsudski (almost like Hitler) that the Russians were weakened by their Civil War. He had hoped to capture more Russian land and create a Lithuanian/Byelorussian puppet state to his east.
Lenin's response was one of overwhelming numerical superiority in weapons and men but the lack of a logistical model and the idea that the Russians would be able to live off the land like they did in their fight against the Whites. Lenin had hoped for a quick victory in Poland, that would lead to a People's Revolution in Germany that would then merge with the Hungarian Bolshevik Republic to the take over the Balkans. Didn't happen.
The Russian attack was a two pronged approach with Tuchachevsky in the North towards Warsaw and then towards Berlin, and Voroshilov (with Stalin as his political Kommissar) to the South through Lvov and then onto Vienna and Prague. As the Northern attack actually passed above Warsaw, Trotsky (War Kommissar) ordered Voroshilov to attack from the South. Voroshilov refused (Trotsky wanted both him and Stalin executed but was stopped by Lenin) and sent Budionny and his cavalry to try and encircle Lvov. Budionny and his accompanying infantry were fought to a standstill by the Poles and were almost surrounded. These forces then had to retreat being no help to the northern attack.
After almost a year of battle and the deaths of many soldiers on both sides, they ended up almost where the started and signed a peace treaty with boundaries that were the same as were approved final by the Allies at Versailles. [NOTE: During the purges in the late 1930s of the Russian military, all of the officers involved in the Northern prong were liquidated, but Voroshilov and Budionny were left alone. What might have been the outcome of the execution of Stalin on the future USSR and World War 2?]
Zeb Kantrowitz
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